Contents

Foreword	7
Preface	11
Abbreviations	13
1. Introduction	15
1.1 The Lebanese Conundrum	15
1.2 Previous Research	19
1.3 Relevance of the Topic	25
1.4 Definition of Terms	26
1.5 Goal of the Thesis	30
1.6 Methods and Data	30
1.7 Structure	31
2. The Lebanese Society and the Political System	33
2.1 The Lebanese Parties	34
3. The Intra-Case Comparison: Lebanon 1972-1975 and 2005-2008	39
3.1 Poverty	39
3.2 Inequality	40
3.3 Political Structures	43
3.4 Centripetalism and its Limits	45
3.5 External Factors	46
3.6 Summary of the Comparative Case Study	47
4. Hypotheses and the Consociational Conflict Model	49
5. Test of Hypothesis 1	53
5.1 The Independence Uprising as a Precedent for Successful, Non-violent, Cross-Sectarian Collective Political Action	53
5.2 The Civil War and the Independence Uprising	55
5.3 Hypothesis 1: Results	58
6. The Independence Uprising: A Democratic Revolution?	61
6.1 The Significance of the Hariri Assassination as a Trigger	61
6.2 The Lebanese Regime Before and After the Independence Uprising	64

6 Contents

7. Testing Hypothesis 2 and the Model of a Consociational Conflict 7.1 The Usage of the "Democratic Revolution" in the Consociational Conflict	67 67
	7.2 Crisis Containment of the Political Leaders
7.3 Domestic Coalition Making7.4 The Lebanese Parties and Outside Supporters7.5 The Nahr al Bared Fighting and Crisis Management7.6 The Use of Violence in the Consociational Conflict	73
	78
	85
	89
7.7 The Media as Instruments in the Consociational Conflict	120
7.8 The Economic Dimension of Consociational Conflict	125
9 Hymothesis 2: Pasults	131
8. Hypothesis 2: Results	132
8.1 Hypothesis 2a	137
8.2 Hypothesis 2b	137
9. Concluding Remarks	139
9.1 Further Theoretical Considerations	139
9.2 Limits of the Model's Applicability	142
9.3 Future Research	143
9.4 Lebanon at the Crossroads	146
Afterword	149
Literature and Sources	151