

# Contents

1.	Introduction: Civil Society and European Governance	15
1.1.	Civil society and lobbying: Defining terms	16
1.1.1.	Civil society: Normative and analytical dimensions	16
1.1.2.	Lobbying: Communication and information exchange	19
1.2.	Research questions and research design	21
1.3.	Methods	24
2.	Interest Intermediation and the European Union	27
2.1.	The normative perspective: Legitimacy and interest groups	28
2.2.	Interest intermediation systems: Who is involved?	31
2.2.1.	Pluralism: Competition among equal interests	31
2.2.2.	Corporatism: Structured interest intermediation	33
2.2.3.	Policy networks: Focus on complex relationships	34
2.2.4.	Applicability to the EU interest intermediation system	39
2.2.5.	What added value do lobbyists bring into the system?	43
2.3.	European governance	45
2.3.1.	The vertical dimension: Multi-level governance	47
2.3.2.	The horizontal dimension: Network governance	49
2.4.	Europeanisation as a process challenging governance	52
2.5.	Summary: What interest intermediation system exists in the EU and how are interests promoted in this system?	55
3.	The 'lobby planet' in Brussels	57
3.1.	How many lobbyists really work in Brussels?	58
3.2.	Accreditation and transparency	60
3.3.	Lobbying targets	65
3.3.1.	European Commission	66
3.3.2.	European Parliament	67
3.3.3.	Council of Ministers	68
3.3.4.	Advisory Bodies	69
3.4.	Lobbying strategies and resources	69
3.5.	Summary: What is a good lobbyist?	72

4.	Interest intermediation systems in the Visegrád countries: Communist heritage and new paths	75
4.1.	Communist heritage	75
4.2.	New beginnings	76
4.3.	Country profiles	82
4.3.1.	Czech Republic: Divided and invisible	82
4.3.2.	Hungary: Strong services, weak advocacy	83
4.3.3.	Poland: Small, but strategic	83
4.3.4.	Slovakia: Lessons learned	84
4.4.	Interest intermediation systems in the Visegrád countries	86
4.5.	Complying with the EU	88
4.6.	Summary: What national experience and what expectations do the CEE interest groups bring to Brussels?	90
5.	Newcomers on the European level: Participants or observers in European governance?	91
5.1.	Discovering the structures: Social network analysis	91
5.1.1.	Setting the scene: Boundary specification and sampling	92
5.1.2.	Actors and relations	94
5.2.	Data collection	95
5.2.1.	Data collection techniques	96
5.2.2.	Pre-test	97
5.2.3.	Response rate and data set	98
5.3.	Data and selected measures	99
5.3.1.	Cohesion	99
5.3.2.	Centrality	100
5.3.3.	Prestige	101
5.4.	Selected issue: Directive on services	102
5.4.1.	Stakeholders and their interests	105
5.4.2.	What did stakeholders do in order to change the proposal of the directive?	107
5.4.3.	Mapping the communication network	110
5.4.3.1.	Cohesion measures: The information flow	110
5.4.3.2.	Centrality: Main players, outsiders and brokers	117
5.4.3.3.	Mapping the information exchange network	121
5.4.3.4.	Centrality: Who is the most expansive in the network?	123
5.4.3.5.	Prestige: Who is the most prestigious in the network?	125
5.5.	Summary: The location of stakeholders from Visegrád countries in the issue network and their opportunities to make inputs to the formulation of the Services Directive	127

6.	Why do the actors from the Visegrád countries stay in the observer role?	130
6.1.	Explaining the structures: Qualitative interviews	130
6.1.1.	Selection of interview partners	132
6.1.2.	Interview guide	133
6.2.	General profiles of the actors from the Visegrád countries in Brussels	133
6.2.1.	Organisational form and history	133
6.2.2.	Perception of mission and functions	136
6.3.	Directive on services: Why the actors from the Visegrád countries are not visible in the network	139
6.3.1.	Actors on the national level are not conscious of European politics	139
6.3.2.	A lack of networking in the multilevel system	142
6.3.2.1.	Co-operation with the Permanent Representation	142
6.3.2.2.	Co-operation with other stakeholders on the European level	145
6.4.	The origins of the co-operation difficulties	147
6.4.1.	Affiliation with organised civil society	148
6.4.2.	Attitude to lobbying in the Visegrád countries	150
6.5.	General reasons for difficulties working on the European level	151
6.5.1.	Financial reasons	151
6.5.2.	Personnel resources	155
6.6.	Summary: Why are the Visegrad organisations passive on the European level?	156
7.	Conclusion	159
7.1.	Overview of results	159
7.2.	Implications for the democratic legitimacy of European governance	167
7.3.	Outlook: Recommendations for the organisations and future perspectives	169
7.4.	Conclusion	171
8.	Bibliography	174
9.	Appendices	191
9.1.	Appendix 1: Questionnaire	191
9.2.	Appendix 2: List of interview partners	197
9.3.	Appendix 3: Interview guide	198
9.4.	Appendix 4: Network data set	200