Contents

Ack	nowled	gments	9			
Intro	duction	n	11			
I	"The Most Serious Crisis So Far:" The January 1963 Caesura					
	1	De Gaulle's Press Conference of 14 January 1963 1.1 The British Common Market Bid 1.2 French Reform Claims and Nuclear Weapons 1.3 Intra-Alliance Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nassau Summit 1.4 The Press Conference	34 35 37 41 47			
	2	The French-German Elysée Treaty of 22 January 1963 2.1 The Fouchet Plans and French-German Cooperation 2.2 The Elysée Treaty 2.3 Shock in Washington and Apprehension in Europe	50 51 53 56			
	3	The NATO Link 3.1 Implications for NATO 3.2 The Renewed MLF Debate 3.3 Reflecting the Crisis – Observers' Views 3.4 Damage Control à la NATO Council 3.5 May 1963: Ministers Discuss the State of the Alliance	60 61 67 72 76 82			
	4	Conclusion	89			
II	"Facing a Period of Doubt" – NATO, France, Détente, 1963/64					
	1	1.3 Doubts and Questions in the Summer and Fall of 1963	94 94 101 107 113			
	2	 2.1 "Limited Cohesion:" The Alliance One Year After the Clash 2.2 "We Must Find Out Where We Stand" – Stikker and France 2.3 Interpreting de Gaulle: "Why He Does It Is A Riddle" 	117 118 124 129 134			
	3	Conclusion	141			

III	"Ensure that NATO Survives:" Reflections Prevailing, Summer – December 1964					
	1	1.1 Fo	g the Drive – NATO in Early Fall 1964 ollow-up on The Hague: Summit Ideas and Study Proposals the Transition from Stikker to Brosio as Triggering Effect for	144 144		
			ovement in NATO ne MLF Controversy and its Impact on the Vigor of NATO	151 157		
	2	Struggling for Definitions – NATO in the Winter of 1964 2.1 "We Are in an Awkward Transition Period" – Assessing the				
		2.2 Cr 2.3 Av	nallenges risis or No Crisis? The Run-Up to the Winter Convention woid Confrontation, Study the Future: The December 1964 eeting	165170177		
	3	Conclus	sion	185		
IV	"Stepping Up the Pace:" Crisis Peak, Spring and Summer 1965					
	1	1.1 Ca 1.2 Po 1.3 Sh	Out French Intentions, Spring 1965 anada's Proposal to Study the Future of the Alliance ondering the Consequences of French Dissociation attering of Hopes for a Mutually Agreeable NATO Solution assuming Leadership – the US at the May 1965 Meeting	188 188 195 201 206		
	2	2.1 Ins 2.2 Nu	Aultilateralism to Classical Diplomacy, Summer 1965 stitutionalizing the Debate on the State of the Alliance? uclear Sharing or Nuclear Consultation? Acting on the ATO Crisis	215216221		
			risis in the EEC and NATO Consultations in Europe	228		
	3	Conclus	sion	235		
V	"Getting the Alliance Moving Again:" Crisis vs. Opportunity, Fall 1965 – Spring 1966 2					
	1	NATO	Planning at Full Speed, Fall 1965 ashington's Focus on Trilateral Measures and Institutional	238		
		1.2 Co	eadership onfrontation? Allied Strategies toward	239		
			rance ack on Track: The Alliance in December 1965	245254		
	2	2.1 De	isis Enacted at Last: The French Withdrawal, Spring 1966 e Gaulle's Announcement risis as Solution? Allied Perceptions of the French Move	261 262 268		
	3	Conclus	sion	279		

Conclusion	281
Abbreviations	293
Bibliography	295